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The daylight saving time anomaly in relation to firms targeted for mergers  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper finds evidence that daylight saving time changes influence the decision-making of 
investors when trading in firms targeted for mergers. We find that investors who face 
imbalances in their circadian cycle generate more positive abnormal stock returns upon the 
announcement of target firms. This result holds within a large number of robustness tests. 
Target firms also experience more pronounced stock return volatility in response to their 
merger announcements the first trading day after clock changes. Overall, these results seem to 
indicate that investors may overreact to available information when experiencing imbalances 
in their circadian cycle.    
JEL classification: G11; G12 
Keywords: Daylight Saving Time Changes; Circadian Cycle; Merger and Acquisition; Target 
Firms; Stock Price Efficiency 
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1. Introduction 
Sleep influences humans through a number of neurobiological processes (e.g., Achermann, 
2004). The interaction of the circadian and the homeostatic processes undertaken by neural 
systems in the brainstem and basal forebrain determines the sleep/wake pattern. Dinges (1995), 
Alhola and Polo-Kantola (2007), Banks and Dinges (2007), and Walker (2017) offer 
comprehensive reviews indicating that there is a negative influence of sleepiness on 
participants’ mood swings, attention, memory, and performance. A few studies (e.g., Kamstra 
et al., 2000; Pinegar, 2002) within the field of finance proxy sleep disturbances based on 
daylight saving time changes and explore whether investor decisions differ in relation to their 
sleep disturbances at a market level. However, as discussed in further detail below, existing 
empirical results are mixed. In this study, we use target firms in the context of firm mergers in 
order to contribute to the daylight saving time change anomaly. We offer empirical validity on 
the significance of daylight saving time changes in relation to investor reaction to the merger 
announcements of target firms.  
Relatively few published studies have explored the significance of sleep in the field of 
finance by using the daylight saving time changes to proxy sleep disturbances. Investors are 
likely to experience sleep imbalances during the particular weekends that daylight saving time 
changes occur, and their transactions are thus expected to be influenced by sleepiness on 
Mondays following a time change. All participants within a country are vulnerable to the clock 
change; thus, a significant proportion of the population will exhibit sleep disturbances. Beyond 
the field of finance, a number of other studies have also used daylight saving time changes in 
order to explore the significance of sleep on human decisions. Smith (2016) and Robb and 
Barnes (2018), for example, report that more car accidents take place on the day following 
daylight saving time changes, mostly attributed to sleep imbalances. Also, Cho et al. (2017) 
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find evidence that judges give longer sentences on Mondays following daylight saving time 
changes in relation to other Mondays. 
However, existing empirical results on the relation between daylight saving time 
changes and stock market returns are mixed. Kamstra et al. (2000) offer the first empirical 
results in this field. They use both fall and spring daylight saving time changes in order to 
capture imbalances in investors’ circadian cycles and show that stock market returns on 
Mondays are relatively poor following weekends with daylight saving time changes. There has, 
though, been some debate between Pinegar (2002) and Kamstra et al. (2002) on the robustness 
of this empirical relation. Pinegar (2002, p. 1257) argues that the empirical relation is driven 
by two outliers linked with stock market crises. Gregory-Allen et al. (2010) further report that 
daylight saving time changes are not related with stock market returns in an updated 
international sample. Berument et al. (2010) explore whether daylight saving time changes are 
related with stock market returns and with stock market volatility. They follow an EGARCH 
model with 15 lags and find no relations. Kamstra et al. (2010, 2013), though, criticize the 
selection of over-parameterized models followed by Berument et al. (2010) and Berument and 
Dogan (2011). They instead report that daylight saving time changes are still related negatively 
with stock market returns in the sample used in their initial study (1967-1997) with the use of 
both OLS and maximum likelihood estimations.  
Based on the extensive evidence in the sleep literature, it is clear that sleep matters in 
our decision making. There is no reason to believe that investors are an exception to this rule. 
In this study, we focus on offering some empirical validity of the significant impact of sleep 
patterns on investor decisions. Based on the sleep literature (e.g., Dinges, 1995; Alhola and 
Polo-Kantola, 2007; Banks and Dinges, 2007; Walker, 2017), we expect that the quality of 
investors’ decisions is relatively poor when they experience imbalances in their sleep cycles. 
Human decisions are suboptimal when we lack sleep, since we tend to lack attention to detail, 
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as well as the required level of concentration. There is also plenty of evidence that investors 
have relatively stronger mood swings when experiencing imbalances in their circadian cycle 
(e.g., Womack et al., 2013), and it is thus more likely that investors may overreact to available 
information.  
Our study deviates from the previous literature in the field of finance by using the 
extreme context of target firms in order to test whether sleep imbalances matter. Mergers are 
typically unexpected events, as indicated by the significant stock return reactions to their 
announcements. Target firms experience on average returns of 10% on their announcements 
(e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; King, 2009). If investors are 
influenced by sleep imbalances, a relation should be evidenced, if at all, within target firms 
simply due to the extreme stock returns that they experience.  
Target firms tend to experience the most pronounced positive abnormal stock returns 
on merger deals announced on Mondays due to the high investor attention on Mondays in 
relation to other days of the week (e.g., Louis and Sun, 2010). As shown in Table 1, we indeed 
find in our sample that targets announced on weekend & Mondays tend to experience the most 
pronounced positive abnormal stock returns. In particular the average abnormal stock returns 
for targets announced over the weekend and on Mondays are 11.98%, while the counterpart 
stock returns on other days are less than 11%. The difference in abnormal stock returns between 
weekend & Monday versus other days is 1.41%, which is economically significant and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. As stated above it is likely that investors who experience 
imbalances in their circadian cycle to overreact to available information. Such investors may 
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then push targets’ stock returns to more extreme levels and thus to stronger stock returns in the 
announcement of such a positive firm event.1    
[Please insert Table 1 around here] 
We use US target firms as part of the mergers announced between 1977 and 2017 and 
find that daylight saving time changes are indeed related with investor reaction to their 
announcements. We find that target firms experience 2.66% stronger abnormal stock returns 
upon their announcement day on Mondays following clock changes in relation to other target 
firms after relevant controls. We find that this result holds within a large number of robustness 
tests. There is no relation when testing the significance of US daylight saving time changes on 
the stock returns of target firms in countries around the world that experience no daylight 
saving time changes. We further find that target firms experience more pronounced stock 
returns on their merger announcements on Mondays following daylight saving time changes in 
relation to the announcement of other targets. Overall, these results highlight the significance 
of sleep deprivation on investor decisions.   
                                                          
1 Note that the sign of the relation between sleepiness and stock returns differs in our context in relation to previous 
literature. Kamstra et al. (2000) report that stock market returns are lower on Mondays following daylight saving 
time changes. Although it is difficult to reconcile the empirical results with direct evidence, the context of this 
study differs significantly from the stock market index explored by Kamstra et al. (2000). According to the 
Monday effect (e.g., French, 1980), stock market returns tend to be less pronounced on Mondays in relation to 
other days of the week. As discussed in the text above target firms tend instead to experience strong returns on 
their announcement on Mondays due to high investor attention in the particular day (e.g., Louis and Sun, 2010). 
To the extent that investors who experience imbalances in their circadian cycle tend to overreact to available 
information, they may thus generate relatively low stock market returns on Mondays after clock changes and 
relatively high targets’ stock returns on Mondays after clock changes reflecting the opposite signed information 
available.   
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We contribute to the finance literature by empirically validate the significance of 
daylight saving time changes in the extreme context of target firms. This result is important 
considering that previous published papers (e.g., Kamstra et al., 2000; Pinegar, 2002; Gregory-
Allen et al., 2010; Berument et al., 2010) show mixed results on the relation between daylight 
saving time changes and stock market returns, and no relation between daylight saving time 
changes and stock market volatility. Even though we use mergers as the context of our analysis, 
our contribution is to a less extent towards this field, mostly because daylight saving time 
changes occur only twice a year. Our results are of general interest to the finance community. 
We report that investors seem to interpret new information differently in line with their sleep 
patterns, which is an issue related with the stock price efficiency debate. Variability of stock 
returns is also a key variable in finance, such as in risk management, in predicting volatility 
and in asset pricing. This study shows evidence that the imbalance of investors’ circadian 
cycles can influence targets’ stock returns and their variability beyond changes in 
fundamentals.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes this study.   
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
We access US domestic mergers and acquisitions from SDC Thomson OneBanker. We collect 
merger deals from 1977, which is the earliest available, until November 2017. We explore 
public-to-public merger deals of completed merger announcements, with at least 50% 
acquisition. We also restrict our sample to merger deals where available targets’ relative size 
as measured by their market capitalization in relation to that of bidders is at least 1%. We also 
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exclude merger deals classified as minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
spinoffs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. These restrictions are commonly used in merger 
literature (e.g., Moeller et al., 2004; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). As discussed in the 
introduction, we focus our analysis on target firms, since they exhibit very pronounced stock 
performances upon their merger announcements. Our final sample comprises 5,713 target firms 
out of which 90 are announced on Mondays or over the weekend following US daylight saving 
time changes and 5623 on the remaining days.   
We collect from SDC Thomson OneBanker data on whether there was a rumor prior to 
each merger announcement; the SIC industry code for both targets and bidders; whether there 
was blockholder activity at the time of the merger announcement; whether the merger deal was 
tender, competitive, or hostile; and whether the pooling of interest method or the purchase 
method was used. We also collect from SDC Thomson OneBanker the method of payment 
(e.g., stock or cash and the relevant percentage), and targets’ Datastream codes. We use the 
Datastream codes to access from Datastream the following data for targets: daily stock returns, 
daily stock prices, daily market capitalization (in millions), and the number of analysts 
following each firm.2 The timing of relevant data collection is one day before each merger 
announcement. We estimate abnormal stock returns of target firms in excess of the 
corresponding stock market returns on the same day.3 We winsorize abnormal stock returns of 
targets’ firms at the top and bottom 1% (in total 2%) for main analysis in order to ensure that 
                                                          
2 Due to the large amount of missing data (51% in our sample), we record the number of analysts as zero if data 
are not available. It is likely that relatively small firms have very few, if any, analysts following them. In 
untabulated results, we find that our conclusions are the same when excluding the number of analysts from the 
analysis.       
3 We estimate logarithmic stock returns.  
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our results are not driven by few observations (Pinegar, 2002). We also download targets’ 
trading volume, which is estimated as their daily volume divided by the number of outstanding 
shares. All values are measured in $.  
According to our data, and as an example, Gilead Sciences Inc. acquired 100% of Kite 
Pharma Inc. on 28 August 2017. The relative size of the acquisition was 0.8, thirteen analysts 
followed Kite Pharma Inc., and there was a rumor available that the deal was likely to take 
place. In response to this, Kite Pharma’s abnormal stock returns experienced a significant run-
up before its merger announcement, equal to 30%. Kite Pharma’s abnormal stock returns 
gained a further 25% on the day of its merger announcement.     
In line with the sleep literature developed in finance (e.g., Kamstra et al., 2000; Pinegar, 
2002), we use daylight saving time changes to proxy investor sleepiness. Investors are likely 
to experience sleep disturbances during those particular weekends, and their transactions are 
thus expected to be influenced by sleepiness on Mondays following the time change. Daylight 
saving time mostly takes place in the US on the second Sunday in March and the first Sunday 
in November. We collect the exact dates of US daylight saving time changes from Wikipedia.4   
  
2.2 Methodology 
Our dependent variable for our main analysis is the abnormal stock returns of target firms on 
their merger announcement day, day 0. The few mergers that are announced over the weekend 
(less than 2% of the total number of merger deals in our sample) are grouped with Monday 
merger announcements, since Monday is the day that investors would first react to the new 
information. Our main independent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one for merger 
                                                          
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_time_in_the_United_States. 
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deals announced over the weekend or on Mondays following daylight saving time, and zero 
otherwise. We follow the conventional approach within the literature (e.g., Kamstra et al., 
2000) by including both fall and spring clock changes when measuring daylight saving time 
changes. The argument developed in the literature is that both time changes influence investors’ 
circadian cycles and thus both should influence investor decisions. In untabulated results we 
indeed support empirically this conjecture by finding that both parameter coefficients during 
fall and spring clock changes are significantly positive.  
  We control for a number of variables that may influence the magnitude of the abnormal 
target stock returns on targets’ announcements. We first control for rumors, since they are an 
important determinant of the announcement effect for target firms (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; King, 2009). When a rumor is available prior to a merger 
announcement, investors manage to predict the merger and thus buy stocks of forthcoming 
target firms. There is thus an increase in stock returns of targets with rumors prior to their 
merger announcements, and a relatively less pronounced increase is experienced on their 
merger announcement day. The rumors are collected from SDC Thomson OneBanker and are 
available as a dummy variable that takes one for merger deals with rumors, and zero otherwise. 
To ensure that targets’ stock returns on their announcement day are not related with their prior 
stock performance, we further control for the actual target price run-up prior to their merger 
announcements. We estimate the cumulative abnormal stock returns -30 days prior to each 
merger announcement until day -1.     
 We also control for firms’ market capitalization, price, the number of analysts 
following, and the presence of blockholders’ activity around the merger announcement. Small 
firms, with low prices and few analysts, typically exhibit relatively larger stock return 
movements. Blockholders’ activity variable is a dummy that takes one for merger deals with 
relevant activity, and zero otherwise. Blockholders’ activity is related with the information 
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environment available within a merger, and it could potentially influence the magnitude of the 
stock price reaction of targets on their merger announcements. There may be a strong 
correlation among these variables, but we include them all in our model. We are not interested 
per se in the sign and the statistical significance of their parameter coefficients, but we want to 
ensure that firm characteristics that may drive targets’ stock returns are not behind the relation.  
We also add some merger deal characteristics that are most commonly linked with the 
stock announcement effect of bidders (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate, 2003) for further assurance. In particular, we add a dummy for merger deals with 
more than one bidder, for tender merger deals, for only stock payment deals, for only cash 
payment deals, for hostile merger deals, for pooling of interest method, and for merger deals 
when target and bidding firms do not share the first two SIC industry digits.  
Finally, we add three-day lagged abnormal target stock returns to further ensure that 
the relation is in excess of normal variation in their stock returns. We add fixed effects per year, 
per day of the week, and per month in order to control for potential time variations. For 
example, some literature (e.g., Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Penman, 1987; Damodaran, 1989; 
Louis and Sun, 2010) suggests that investors underreact to information announced on Fridays 
because of their low attention. By contrast, investors’ attention is high for Monday 
announcements. We estimate OLS regressions with Petersen’s (2009) clustered standard errors 
on each day of the week across the study. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. As 
expected, targets experience significant return reactions to their merger announcements (e.g., 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; King, 2009). We find that the average 
abnormal stock returns for targets on their merger announcement are 11.02%. These strong 
stock returns motivate the study to focus on targets, as discussed in the introduction. There are 
also evidence of strong increases in cumulative target firms’ stock returns prior to their merger 
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announcements in the interval period (-30, -1 where 0 is the merger announcement day), 4.19%. 
This result confirms evidence from the target price run up literature (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; King, 2009) of leak to information prior to relevant public 
announcements.   
 [Please insert Table 2 around here] 
 
3. Empirical findings  
3.1 Investor sleepiness and targets’ abnormal stock returns  
We explore in this section the abnormal stock returns of target firms upon their merger 
announcements on Mondays following daylight saving time changes versus other days. The 
dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns of target firms, and the main independent 
variable is the clock change dummy variable. We control for a number of variables as discussed 
in the methodology section. We expect that investors interpret new information differently 
when experiencing imbalances on their circadian cycle. Investors who face discrepancy in their 
sleep patterns have relatively more extreme mood swings and it is thus more likely to overreact 
to available information. Such investors may then make the target firms that normally 
experience gains on their merger announcements to even more pronounced profits.      
Table 3 presents results with the addition of seasonality dummies and the lagged target 
stock returns at column (1), with the further addition of firm characteristics at column (2), and 
with the usage of all control variables at column (3). We undertake this analysis with the 
gradual inclusion of additional control variables in order to explore the sensitivity of our results 
to the variables used. We find that target firms experience 2.66% stronger abnormal stock 
returns on Mondays following clock changes in relation to other target firms after controlling 
for the full list of the control variables used. This relation is significant at the 1% level and the 
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magnitude of this difference is economically significant. There are only slight differences in 
the magnitude of the parameter coefficient for clock change with the addition of control 
variables highlighting that the relation is unlikely to be driven by firm or merger characteristics.    
As expected, we also find that targets experience a lower magnitude stock price reaction 
to their merger announcements when a rumor is published prior to the announcement and when 
significant run up was experienced prior to each merger announcement. These results are in 
line with those shown in the target price run-ups literature (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; 
Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; King, 2009). There are also evidence that targets experience 
more pronounced stock returns on cash-financed merger deals and on hostile/tender merger 
deals, while they experience lower abnormal stock returns on the announcement of stock 
merger deals. Once again these results are in line to an extent with evidence available from the 
merger literature (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
Some of our remaining control variables fail to indicate significance, which is perhaps due to 
multicollinearity, such as between market capitalization and the number of analysts following 
a firm. As discussed earlier, we are happy to accept a level of multicollinearity on these 
variables for the purposes of this study.  
[Please insert Table 3 around here] 
   
3.2 Robustness tests  
We here explore the robustness on the relation between clock changes and targets’ abnormal 
stock returns. We include all the control variables, but we do not tabulate them for space 
considerations. Table 4 shows the empirical results. Column (1) first explores the relation when 
comparing abnormal target stock returns following daylight saving time in relation to other 
Mondays. Although we added day of the week fixed effects in earlier estimations, this test 
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intends to offer further validation that our results are present within only Mondays’ merger 
announcements. Although the number of available observations is significantly reduced, we 
still find that the relevant parameter coefficient remains significantly positive.  
[Please insert Table 4 around here] 
Column (2) shows results for only merger deals with 100% acquisition. We find that 
the parameter coefficient in clock change remains significantly positive within this subset. 
Column (3) reports results without winsorizing the abnormal stock returns of target firms on 
their merger announcement day. We previously winsorized relevant abnormal stock returns at 
the top/bottom 1%, and we explore here whether this decision would influence the relation. 
Once again, we find that the parameter coefficient of clock change remains significantly 
positive when no winsorization occurs.     
Column (4) estimates the regression within the sub-sample of target firms with positive 
abnormal trading volume. SDC Thomson OneBanker only offers the day of merger 
announcements, without specifying the timing of these announcements. As an example, some 
merger announcements could have taken place relatively late in the day or even after the close 
of the stock market; thus, investors may not have time to react to available information. We 
estimate the abnormal trading volume for each firm on the merger announcement day in excess 
of the normal trading volume that takes place in the interval period of -100 to -31 days prior to 
each merger announcement. We estimate the main relation only within target firms that 
experienced positive abnormal trading volume on the day of their merger announcements. 
These are the merger deals that are most likely announced relatively early in the day. We find 
that the parameter coefficient of clock changes remains significantly positive within this sub-
sample.  
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Column (5) follows a matching procedure as discussed by Abadie et al. (2004) in order 
to further test whether firm characteristics drive our results. We use LnMV and all merger 
characteristics used in this study to identify matching firms while we specify a one-to-one firm 
match. We use the Mahalanobis metric matching (Mahalanobis, 1936) for relevant matching 
firm identification, which is widely used in recent studies in finance (e.g., Kritzman and Li, 
2010). The advantage of the relevant distance metric is that matching firms are selected 
automatically by the developed algorithm, which minimizes the distance per firm in our sample 
per matching criterion. Once again, we find that firm characteristics do not drive our relation 
with the use of this matching analysis. If anything, the difference in abnormal stock returns 
increases with the use of matched sample analysis (6.39%). 
Column (6) follows a GARCH-style analysis and presents results from the mean 
equation. We estimate GARCH(1,1) in line with Bollerslev (1986).  In line with our previous 
findings, we find that the parameter coefficient on the clock change remains significantly 
positive at the 1% level with the use of maximum likelihood estimations. The magnitude of the 
relation is not affected by the model followed.  
Finally at column (7), we identify 106 countries that have never followed daylight 
saving time changes.5 This offers an ideal setting to undertake a placebo test. Once again we 
use daylight saving time changes in the US as the main independent variable. The main 
dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns of global target firms on their merger 
announcement. We find that the parameter coefficient of clock change is economically and 
statistically insignificant. When domestic investors experience no disturbances of their 
circadian cycles, the relation disappears.        
 
                                                          
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daylight_saving_time_by_country 
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3.3 Investor sleepiness and the variance of targets’ stock returns  
We further estimate the relation between investor sleepiness and the variance of targets’ 
abnormal stock returns. Berument et al. (2010) find no relation between daylight saving time 
changes and stock market volatility. As discussed in the introduction, we expect that investors 
face more extreme mood swings and thus likely to generate more extreme stock returns when 
they face imbalances in their circadian cycle. We therefore expect a positive relation between 
daylight saving time changes and targets’ stock return volatility.   
We first estimate the absolute and the squared abnormal stock returns of target firms on 
their merger announcement day. In these tests we do not winsorize targets’ abnormal stock 
returns, while we use all control variables as previously shown in column 3 of Table 3. As 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we find that the parameter coefficient on the clock 
change is significantly positive at the 1% level showing that targets’ stock returns are more 
pronounced on Mondays after daylight saving time changes in relation to other days. Targets 
for example experience 6.44% higher absolute stock returns on Mondays after daylight saving 
time changes in relation to other days. The magnitude of this difference is economically 
significant. Unlike Berument et al. (2010), we find that the context of target firms used by this 
study makes the relation empirically valid. 
[Please insert Table 5 around here] 
We further estimate GARCH(1,1) as follows: 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,ℎ𝑖𝑖) and the conditional variance of the residual 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
modelled as ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣0 + 𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖−12 . 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the abnormal stock return of target firm 
i on the merger announcement day. In line with above result, we find that the parameter 
coefficient on the clock change (𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) is significantly positive in the variance equation 
indicating that targets experience more volatile abnormal stock returns on Mondays after 
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daylight saving time changes in relation to other days. We do not though tabulate relevant 
results since we find that the parameter coefficient of the constant (𝑣𝑣0) is significantly negative 
which violates the model’s assumption. Variance cannot be negative (e.g., Nelson and Cao, 
1992). As shown in column (3), we instead tabulate results that arrive from using the 
Exponential GARCH estimation (Nelson, 1991). This model is expressed in the log of ht as 
ln (ℎ𝑖𝑖) = 𝑣𝑣0 + 𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽ln (ℎ𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛾𝛾
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
�ℎ𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝜃𝜃[|𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1|
�ℎ𝑡𝑡−1
− �2
𝜋𝜋
] (Brooks, 2005) and so the 
conditional variance equation is always positive regardless of the sign of the parameter 
coefficients. Once again, we find that the parameter coefficient on the clock change is 
significantly positive.   
 
4. Conclusion 
We use firms targeted for acquisition as the context of our study in order to contribute to the 
research on daylight saving time change anomaly. We find evidence indicating that investor 
decisions may vary due to very modest imbalances of their circadian cycle, as long as the 
relation is tested within an extreme stock return context such as that of the merger 
announcement of target firms. We report that targets exhibit more pronounced positive stock 
returns on Mondays following daylight saving time changes in relation to other mergers. 
Investors tend to exhibit more pronounced mood swings when experiencing sleep disturbances 
(e.g., Womack et al., 2013). Our evidence seems to indicate that investors overreact to available 
information when facing disturbances to their circadian cycles.  
Our results offer a policy recommendation by showing that daylight saving time 
changes are not helpful for financial markets. There has been an ongoing debate on the 
usefulness of following daylight saving time changes in the modern world. A number of 
jurisdictions in the US have actually envisaged banning daylight saving time changes 
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altogether. As an example, Rusty Glover, a Republican state senator from Mobile, Alabama, 
stated, “I would be extremely happy to not go home in the dark… and I think we would see a 
little more productivity, too.”6  The European Union also recently took the decision to proceed 
with abolishing daylight saving time changes. This decision is not compulsory but a suggestion 
for member states, where each needs to decide by April 2019 whether or not to follow. The last 
compulsory change across all member states within the European Union is on 31 March 2019.7 
Our results also offer some insight into the debate over whether there should be 
organizational changes regarding sleep provisions, as deliberated by Walker (2017). Aetna Inc. 
offers bonuses for employees that manage to sleep well consistently, while Nike Inc. and 
Google Inc. offer flexibility in employees’ work schedules to match sleep preferences or 
patterns. Goldman Sachs Inc. also offers “sleep hygiene” courses, and an increasing number of 
firms allow napping while at work (e.g., Bradshaw, 1999). High-grade lighting has also been 
installed in some offices in order to help employees better regulate their circadian rhythms. 
Still, very little, within very few firms, has been undertaken considering the effects of sleep 
cycles on human decisions. Further provisions are thus required for investment firms that 
would like their fund managers to face less extreme mood swings due to sleep imbalances while 
investing.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/2/daylight-saving-time-should-be-eliminated-say-offi/ 
7 https://www.lvm.fi/en/-/commission-proposes-to-end-seasonal-time-changes-982747 
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Table 1  
Abnormal stock returns of target firms per day of the week. 
This table explores the abnormal stock returns of target firms on their merger announcement day in relation to the 
day of the week the merger announcements occur. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the one percent level.  
  Average Median 
(1) Weekend & Monday 11.98% 7.02% 
(2) Tuesday 10.81% 4.63% 
(3) Wednesday 10.51% 3.81% 
(4) Thursday 10.90% 4.92% 
(5) Friday 9.84% 2.81% 
    
(1) vs (2), (3), (4) & (5)  1.41%***  
  (0.006)  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics. 
This table explores the descriptive statistics of target firms used in the sample. For discussion of the variables 
used, please study the data section.  
 Average Median Minimum Maximum N 
Abnormal stock returns of target firms on 
their merger announcement day 11.02% 5.05% -31.77% 79.29% 5713 
Clock change (Dummy) 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Rumor (Dummy) 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Run ups 4.19% 3.18% -75.58% 68.12% 5713 
LnMV 4.89 4.85 0.00 12.24 5713 
LnPrice 2.60 2.81 0.00 8.40 5713 
Ln#Analysts 0.95 0.69 0.00 3.66 5713 
Blockholders’ activity (Dummy) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Tender (Dummy) 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
More than one bidder (Dummy) 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Cash deal (Dummy) 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Stock deal (Dummy) 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Hostile (Dummy) 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Different industry (Dummy) 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
Pooling of interest method (Dummy) 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 5713 
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Table 3  
Investor sleepiness and the abnormal stock returns of targets. 
This table explores the relation between targets’ abnormal stock returns and clock changes. The dependent 
variable is the abnormal stock returns of target firms on the merger announcement day, day 0. Our main 
independent variable is clock change, which is a dummy that takes one for merger deals announced on Mondays 
or over the weekend following US daylight saving time changes, and zero otherwise. For discussion of the control 
variables used, please study the data section. P-values are shown in parentheses. *, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the ten, and one percent levels, respectively. 
 Abnormal stock returns of target firms on their 
merger announcement day 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Clock change (Dummy) 0.0220*** 0.0269*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Rumor (Dummy)  -0.0734*** -0.0720*** 
  (0.005)    (0.005)    
Run ups  -0.0512*** -0.0590*** 
  (0.002)    (0.003)    
LnMV  -0.0011 -0.0013 
  (0.634)    (0.570)    
LnPrice  0.0227*** 0.0234*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    
Ln#Analysts  0.0009 -0.0007 
  (0.847)    (0.880)    
Blockholders’ activity (Dummy)   0.0653 
   (0.134)    
Tender (Dummy)   0.0383*** 
   (0.000)    
More than one bidder (Dummy)   -0.0156 
   (0.328)    
Cash deal (Dummy)   0.0386*** 
   (0.003)    
Stock deal (Dummy)   -0.0113*   
   (0.078)    
Hostile (Dummy)   0.0204*** 
   (0.005)    
Different industry (Dummy)   0.0149*** 
   (0.005)    
Pooling of interest method (Dummy)   0.0153 
   (0.125)    
Constant 0.1329*** 0.0804*** 0.0776*** 
 (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Three-day lagged target returns Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 5713 5713 5713 
R-square Adj 0.0543 0.0745 0.101 
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Table 4 
Robustness tests.  
This table explores the robustness of the main relation. The dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns of target firms on the merger announcement day, day 0. Our main 
independent variable is clock change, which is a dummy that takes one for merger deals announced on Mondays or over the weekend following US daylight saving time 
changes, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses. ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. 
 Abnormal stock returns of target firms on their merger announcement day 
 Only for 
Monday deals 
Only 100% 
merger deals 
No winsorization 
of stock returns 
With positive abnormal 
trading volume 
Only matching 
firms 
GARCH(1,1) 
Mean equation 
Placebo  
Non-US targets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Clock change (Dummy) 0.0285*** 0.0380*** 0.0240*** 0.0377*** 0.0639** 0.0210*** 0.0059 
 (0.003)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.023) (0.000)    (0.342) 
Constant -0.0548**  0.0570*** 0.0651**  0.0668**   0.0426*** 0.0347 
 (0.017)    (0.003)    (0.048)    (0.018)     (0.000)    (0.117)    
Prior controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Matching ratio     1-1   
N 1695 5238 5713 4785  5713 2415 
R-square Adj 0.1511 0.1005 0.0818 0.1066   0.0446 
Log-L      1957  
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Table 5  
Investor sleepiness and the variance of targets’ stock returns. 
This table explores the relation between investor sleepiness and the variance of targets’ abnormal stock returns on 
their merger announcement day, day 0. Our main independent variable is clock change, which is a dummy that 
takes one for merger deals announced on Mondays or over the weekend following US daylight saving time 
changes, and zero otherwise. For discussion of the control variables used, please study the data section.  P-values 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, 
respectively. 
 Absolute 
abnormal 
stock 
returns 
Squared 
abnormal 
stock 
returns 
 Variance equation 
Abnormal stock returns - EGARCH(1,1) 
 (1) (2)   (3) 
Clock change (Dummy) 0.0644*** 0.0773***  Clock change (Dummy) 0.8793*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.000)    
Rumor (Dummy) -0.0509*** -0.0096  Constant -2.6142*** 
 (0.005)    (0.291)      (0.000)    
Run ups -0.0770*** -0.0607**   L.EARCH 0.1281 
 (0.001)    (0.023)      (0.155)    
LnMV -0.0054**  -0.0148***  L.EARCH_A 0.1432*   
 (0.012)    (0.002)      (0.073)    
LnPrice 0.0023 -0.0083  L.EGARCH 0.1548 
 (0.588)    (0.346)      (0.325)    
 
 
Ln#Analysts 0.0023 0.0058 
 Previously used control 
variables in the mean 
equation 
Yes 
 (0.443)    (0.111)     N 5713 
Blockholders’ activity (Dummy) 0.0433 0.011  Log-L 749 
 (0.300)    (0.571)       
Tender (Dummy) 0.0358*** 0.0283***    
 (0.004)    (0.006)       
More than one bidder (Dummy) -0.0184 -0.0202**     
 (0.104)    (0.041)       
Cash deal (Dummy) 0.0274**  -0.0077    
 (0.016)    (0.626)       
Stock deal (Dummy) -0.0152*** -0.0307***    
 (0.004)    (0.009)       
Hostile (Dummy) 0.0276*** 0.0203*      
 (0.001)    (0.077)       
Different industry (Dummy) 0.0097 0.0022    
 (0.199)    (0.838)       
Pooling of interest method 
(Dummy) 0.0228**  0.0247**  
   
 (0.031)    (0.042)       
Constant 0.1246*** 0.1178**     
 (0.000)    (0.016)       
Three-day lagged corresponding 
returns 
Yes Yes    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes    
Day of the week fixed effects Yes Yes    
Monthly fixed effects Yes Yes    
N 5713 5713    
R-square Adj 0.0769 0.0298    
 
